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Abstract 
Anonymous nature of peer-to-peer (PZP) systems exposes them to malicious activity. Establish- 
ing trust among peers can mitigate attacks from malicious peers. This paper presents distributed 
algorithms used by a peer to reason about ti-ustwoithiness of others based on the available local 
infol.mation which includes past interactions and recommendations received from others. Peers 
collaborate to establish ti-ust among each other without using a priori inforn~ation. Trust decisions 
are adaptive to changes i n  trust among peers. A peer's trustworthiness in providing services and 
giving recommendations is evaluated in service and reco~n~nendation contexts. Defining trust met- 
r i c ~  in separate contexts makes possible to measure trustworthiness of peers more precisely. A 
peer may be a good service provider and a bad recommender at the same time. Interactions among 
peers have varying impol-tance. An interaction loses its importance with time. These effects are 
considered along with the satisfaction of peers while evaluating an interaction. A recommendation 
contains the recommender's confidence in the information provided. This factor is considered with 
trustworthiness of the recommender when evaluating I-ecominendations. A file sharing application 
is simulated to understand advantages of the proposed algorithms in mitigating attacks related with 
services and I-ecominendations. The results of several empirical studies are used to simulate peer, 
resource, and network parameters. This enables us to study the effects of external parameters on 
the algorithms and the evolution of trust relationships among peers. Individual, collaborative and 
pseudonym changing attack scenarios simulate nine different malicious behaviors. In most exper- 
iments, we find that malicious peers are isolated from other peers and their attacks are mitigated. 
There are cases where they obtain a high reputation but their attacks are still contained. 
1 Introduction 
P2P systems rely on collaboration of peers to accomplish tasks. Peers trust each other to perform op- 
erations such as routing file search queries and downloading/uploading files. However, a malicious 
peer can use the trust of others to gain advantage and can harm the operation of a system. Detecting 
malicious behavior is difficult without collaboration. However, feedbacks from peers might be decep- 
tive, and thus, identifying a malicious peer with high confidence becomes a challenge [ I ] .  In such an 
unreliable environment, the ability to reason about trust may help a peer in determining trustworthy 
peers [2]. Every peer can retain long-term trust information about peers it has interacted with. This 
reduces the risk and uncertainty in future interactions [3]. 
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Interactions among peers and feedbacks of peers about each other provides means to establish trust 
among peers [4 ,5 ,6] .  Aberer and Despotovic [4] use P-Grid [7] to provide decentralized and efficient 
access to trust information. The authors assume that trust usually exists among peers and malicious 
behavior is an exception. Peers file complaints about malicious peers. Trustworthiness of a peer is 
measured according to complaints about it. Eigentrust [5] uses transitivity of trust which allows a peer 
to calculate a global trust value for peers. A distributed hash table (CAN [8]) is used to store and 
access global trust information efficiently. Trusted peers are used to leverage the establishment of trust 
among peers. Their experiments show the impacts of individual and collaborative malicious peers on 
a file sharing application and how trust can help to mitigate attacks. PeerTrust (61 defines commiinity 
context and transaction context parameters to address application specific features of interactions. P- 
Grid is used as an efficient access method to trust information. Four different trust calculation methods 
are discussed and studied in experiments. An important aspect of trust calculation is to be adaptive for 
context dependent factors. 
We propose a Self-ORganizing Trust model (SORT) that enables peers to create and manage trust 
relationships without using a prio~i information. Peers must be able establish trust among each other 
without relying on trusted peers [5]. Because, a trusted peer can not observe all interactions among 
peers, and might be source of misleading information. In SORT, a peer assumes other peers as un- 
trustworthy when i t  does not know about them. Assuming the pre-existence of trust among peers [4] 
do not distinguish a newcomer and a trustworthy peer and makes easy that a malicious peer changes 
its pseudonym to clear its bad history (Sybil attack (91). A peer must contribute in order to gain trust 
of another peer. Malicious behavior easily destroys an existing trust relationship [5, 101. Thus, Sybil 
attacks becomes costly for malicious peers. 
The main difficulty in trust models is measuring trust. Trust is a broad social concept and hard to 
explain with numeric metrics [I 1: 2, 121. Classifying peers as either trustworthy or untrustworthy [4] 
may not be a sufficient metric. Trust metrics should have sufficient precision so peers can be ranked 
according to their trustworthiness [12, 131. It makes i t  possible to select better candidates for some op- 
erations, e.g., selecting the most trustworthy peer when downloading a large file. SORT'S trust metrics 
are normalized to take real values between 0 and 1 which is is similar to Eigentrust's normalization 
operation. However, Eigentrust considers two peers equally trustworthy if they are assigned to the 
same trust value even though one has more past interactions. SORT makes this distinction and prefers 
the peer with more past interactions. 
Using a service (e.g., downloading a file) from a peer is called a service itztet-actioii. A peer 
becomes an acquait?taiice of another peer after providing a service to it. All peers are st/-atzget-s to each 
other at the start. A peer expands its set of acquaintances by using services from strangers. A peer 
requests recommendations about a stranger only from its acquaintances. A reco~ii~iiendation represents 
the acquaintance's trust information about the stranger. Recommendations from acquaintances are used 
to calculate a reputation value about a stranger. Reputation is the primary metric when deciding about 
strangers. 
Measuring a peer's trustworthiness about different tasks with one metric [4, 5 ,6 ,  101 may cause in- 
correct decisions about the peer. Providing services and giving recommendations are different tasks and 
should be considered i n  separate contexts. A peer can be good service provider but may give misleading 
recommendations. For this reason, SORT defines two contexts of trust: setvice and recomniendatio17 
corzte.rts. To measure a peer's trustworthiness in these two contexts, sewice trust andrecommenddion 
trzrst metrics are defined. When a peer gives misleading recommendations, i t  loses recommendation 
trust of others but its service trust remains same. Similarly, a failed service interaction only decreases 
the value of service trust metric. 
Combining the information derived through interactions and recomlnendations in one metric may 
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cause the loss of useful information [4, 51. While interactions represent a peer's definite information 
about its acquaintances, recommendations represent suspicious infolmation about them. A peer has 
to combine these two type of information and make independent decisions about others. Suppose a 
peer wants to get a service. If i t  has no acquaintance, it simply chooses to trust any stranger providing 
the service. If the peer has some acquaintances, it may select a stranger based on recommendations 
of acquaintances. As the peer gains more acquaintances, it becomes more selective. It may choose 
not to trust strangers if its acquaintances can deliver its service requests. Trust decisions about an 
acquaintance are based on its past interactions and recommendation of other acquaintances. As more 
interactions happen with an acquaintance, the experience derived through interactions becomes more 
important. 
Using all available information about interactions helps a more precise calculation of trust metrics. 
Assigning only a satisfactorylunsatisfactory rating about an interaction [4,5] is not enough for a precise 
calculation. A peer should be able to express its level of satisfaction about an interaction in more detail 
[14.]. Service interactions might have varying importance [6], e.g., downloading a large file is more 
important than downloading a small one when the network bandwidth is an issue. The effect of an 
interaction on trust calculation should fade as new interactions occur 115: 161. Thus. a peer can not 
take advantage of its past good interactions for a long time and has to continue to behave consistently. 
A recommendation is evaluated according to the value of recommendation trust metric about the 
recommender [5, 6, 101. A recommendation makes a clear distinction between the reconimender's 
own experience and information collected from its acquaintances. Each recommendation affects the 
value of recommendation trust metric about the recommender. A recommendation also contains the 
recommender's level of confidence in the information provided. If i t  has a low confidence. the recom- 
mendation is considered weak. A weak recommendation has less effect on the calculated reputation 
than a strong one. Furthermore, a peer is no more liable than its confidence in  the recommendation. 
If a weak recommendation is false, the value of recommendation trust metric about the recommender 
does not diminish quickly. 
The main contributions of this research are outlined as follows: 
.. . 
Trust metrics are defined in service and recomlnehdation contexts. Two contexts of trust distin- 
guish capabilities of peers based on services provided and recommendations given. 
Distributed algorithms have been defined to help peers about trust decisions based on trust met- 
rics. A peer adaptively adjusts the necessary level of trust according to its trust relationships with 
acquaintances. 
A recommendation evaluation scheme is defined. Evaluation is based on recommendation trust 
metric and the recommender's confidence in the provided information. This enables fair evalua- 
tion of recommendations and more accurate calculation of reputation. 
For service interactions, a sample evaluation scheme is defined on a file sharing application. 
Bandwidth, onlineloffline ratio, file size and popularity are some specific parameters to make a 
precise evaluation. Thus, a better classification of peers can be achieved according to serving 
capabilities. 
Simulation of SORT has been presented on a file sharing application. To observe effects of ex- 
ternal parameters on the proposed algorithms, peer capabilities (bandwidth, number of shared 
files), peer behavior (onlineloffline periods, waiting time for sessions) and resource distribution 
(file sizes. popularity of files) are simulated according to some empirical results [17, 18, 191. 
Nine different malicious behavior are studied. Attacks related with file uploadldownload op- 
erations are always mitigated. A malicious peer who performs collaborative attacks rarely but 
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behaves honest in other times is hardest to counter. Attacks on recommendations are mitigated 
in most scenarios except in a type of malicious peer which performs collaborative attacks against 
a small percentage of peers and stays honest to other peers. 
Outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the related research. The algorithms and 
formal definitions of SORT are explained in Section 3. Section 4 presents the simulation of SORT on a 
file sharing application. The future work opportunities to extend the trust model is discussed in Section 
5. Conclusions are presented in Section 6. 
2 Related Work 
One of the first formal definition of trust is done by Marsh [ I  I]. He defines a formal model of trust 
based on sociological foundations and defines trust as a metric. In this model, an agent uses own 
experiences when building trust and does not use collective information of other agents. Abdul-rahman 
and Hailes' trust model [2] evaluates trust as an aggregation of direct experience and recommendations 
of other parties. Discrete trust metl-ics are defined and recommendations are rated according to their 
semantic distance from the final reputation value. Zhong [I 31 proposes a dynamic trust concept based 
on McKnight's social trust model [ I  21 and defines uncertain evidence as an input when building trust 
relations. Second-order probability and Dempster-Shaferian framework are used for the evaluation of 
uncertain evidence. 
Reputation systems first appeared as a method of building trust in e-con~merce communities. 
Resnick et al. [3] point out limitations and capabilities of reputation systems. Ensuring long-lived 
relationships, forcing feedbacks, checking honesty of reports are some of the main difficulties in repu- 
tation systems. Dellarocas [ I ]  explains two common attacks on reputation systems: unfairly highllow 
ratings and discriminatory seller behavior. He proposes controlled anonymity and cluster filtering 
methods as countermeasures. Despotovic and Aberer [20] study trust establishment in an online trade 
scenario among self-interested sellers and buyers. Trust-aware exchanges can increase economic ac- 
tivity since some exchanges may not happen without a trust establishment. YLI and Singh's model [21] 
propagates trust information through refei-ral chains. Referrals are the primary method of developing 
trust in strangers. Terzi et a]. [22] introduces an algorithm to classify users and assign roles to them 
based on trust relationships. Mui et a]. [23] present a good bibliography search of trust from social life 
disciplines and propose a statistical model based on trust. reputation and reciprocity concepts. In this 
model, reputation can be propagated through multiple referral chains [21]. J ~ s a n g  et a]. [24] discusses 
transitivity of trust and concludes that recommendations based on indirect trust relations may cause 
incorrect trust derivation. Thus, trust topologies should be evaluated carefully before propagating trust 
information. 
Reputation-based trust models are applied to P2P systems after the appearance of first examples. 
Some prominent ones, Aberer and Despotovic [4], Eigentrust [5]. Peertrust [6], are already mentioned 
in the introduction. Cornelli et a]. [25, 261 describe how to make a Gnutella [27] servant reputation- 
aware with a polling protocol. Basically, peers floods reputation queries throughout the network to 
learn about reputations of others. Enhanced version polling protocol also verifies the identity of reply- 
ing peers in reputation query [26]. Although the polling protocol is discussed in detail, a coinputational 
trust model and clear trust metrics are not defined. Selcuk et al. [ lo]  present a vector-based trust model 
relying on interactions and reputation. If a peel- has necessary number of neighbors, only neighbors 
are contacted for a reputation query. Otherwise, the query is flooded throughout the network. Recom- 
mendations are evaluated accordins to the credibility of recommenders. They simulate five types of 
attackers on a file-sharing application. However, they do not present evaluations for deceptive refer- 
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of interaction rating on a P2P file sharing system. 
Most trust models require a query operation to learn about the reputation of peers. Ooi et a]. [28] 
propose that each peer stores its own reputation using signed reputation certificates. Although this ap- 
proach eliminates the need for reputation queries, it requires a public-key infrastructure. Additionally, 
timely update of trust information in a certificate is a problem. Similarly, NICE [29] uses signed cook- 
ies as a proof of a peer's good behavior. NICE forms trust groups and introduces trust-based pricing 
and trading policies to protect integrity of groups. 
Trust has been applied to other problems on P2P networks. Moreton and Twigg [30] aim to increase 
routing security by enforcing collaboratio~~ with a trust protocol. The same authors define a trust 
trading protocol to create an incentive mechanism for P2P networks [31]. Gupta and Somani [32] use 
reputation as a currency to get better quality of service. Peers dynamically form trust groups (TGrp) to 
protect themselves from malicious peers. TGrp peers watch each other closely and have a higher trust 
in each other. When contacting a peer from the outside of a TGrp, the peer's own reputation and its 
TGrp's reputation is considered. Another interesting use of trust in [33] discusses trading privacy to 
gain more trust in pervasive systems. 
3 A Computational Trust Model for P2P Systems 
In this research, we have the following assumptions. A P2P system consists of peers parity in terms 
of responsibility and compiitational power. There are no plivileged, centralized, or trusted peers to 
manage trust relationships among peers. Peers are indistinguishable in computational power, network 
bandwidth and storage space. Although a small fraction of peers may behave maliciously, the majority 
of them are expected to behave honest. Peers occasionally leave and join the network and provide 
services to others and use services from others. For simplicity in discussion, one service operation, 
e.g., file request/download is considered. 
The ith peer is denoted by pi. When pi uses a service of pi, e.g., downloads a file from p,j, 
this is a service interaction for pi ' .  If pi had no service interaction with p j ,  pj is a stranger to pi. 
An acquaiiztanee of pi is the one who has served pi in a service interaction at least once. pi's set 
of acquaintances is denoted by A i .  A peer stores a separate history of service interactions for each 
acquaintance. S H i j  denotes pi's service history with p j .  Since service interactions are added to the 
end of a service history, S H i j  is a time ordered linked list. shi,j denotes the size (current number of 
interactions) of S H i j .  
After finishing or cancelling a service interaction: pi evaluates service quality of the provider. 
The evaluation result of kt" service interaction of pi with pj is denoted by 0 < e: < 1. k is the 
sequence number of the interaction in SH,?.  A cancelled service interaction gets a 0 evaluation value. 
In a file sharing application, authenticity of the downloaded file, average download speed, average 
delay, retransmission rate of packets and onlineloffline periods of the service provider are some of the 
parameters to evaluate a service interaction. 
Service interactions might have varying importance. In a file sharing application, downloading a 
large file is more important than downloading a small one due to consumed network bandwidth. A 
popular file is more valuable than an ordinary one. Each service interaction is assigned a weight to 
quantify importance of interactions. The weight of kt" service interaction of pi with pj is denoted by 
0 < w& < 1. The seniantics to calculate e l j  and ut&. values depend on the application. In Section 4, 
we define some methods to calculate ef j  and n,:. for a file sharing application. 
A service interaction has a fadins effect on trust level as new interactions are added to the history. 
The fading effect of kt" service interaction between pi and pj is denoted by .fe. and calculated as 
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follows: 
After adding (or deleting) a service interaction to S H i i ,  pi recalculates f; values. The fading effect 
can also be defined as a function of time. However, f$ has to be recalculated whenever its value is 
needed. 
t s t ,  is a tiinestai71p value which denotes the finishing time of kt" service interaction of pi with p,. 
A service interaction is deleted after certain period timestamp value. The removal period should be 
determined according to maximum size of histolies and rate of interactions among peers. 
Let 7 be a tuple representing the information about an interaction and defined as T;. = (e;: w,",: f;; tsFj). 
Then, we define S H i j  = {T;. 7;.  . . . 7 -  S H i j  stores only limited number of recent service inter- 
actions of pi with p,j. sh.,,, denotes the upper bound of service history size known by all peers. When 
adding a new service interaction to S H i j 2  T; is deleted if s h I j  = sh,,,. 
SORT defines several trust metrics. Three of them are important: 1-eputatioiz, seivice trust, and 
recoi~~i~~eizdcltioi~ trust. Reputcltioiz metric is a value resulting from the evaluation of recommendations 
of acquaintances. Service trust metric represents a peer's trust in an acquaintance in service context 
based on its past service interactions and reputation. Reputation and service trust values of pi about pj 
are denoted by 0 5 ri.7; s t i j  5 1 respectively. Service trust value is the primary metric to make trust 
decisions when making decisions about a service provider. Reconznzeizdcltiorz trust metric is analogous 
to service trust metric in recommendation context and is used when selecting acquaintances for repu- 
tation queries and evaluating recommendations. Its value is calculated based on past recommendation 
interactions and reputation. Recommendation trust value of pi about pj is denoted by 0 _< r t i j  5 1.  
When pi is a stranger to pi, we define that S H i j  = 8 and rij = s t i j  = r t i j  = 0. If pi is 
interested in a service provided by pj ,  i t  sends a reputation query about pj to its acquaintances. Then, 
it calculates rij value based on the collected recommendations and makes a decision about p j .  If pj has 
not interacted with any of pi's acquaintances in the past, pi does not get back any recommendations. 
Then, pi still sets rij  = 0. This is a protection against the Sybil attack [9] since changing pseudonym 
does not give any advantage to malicious peers. 
Table 1: Notations related with service trust metrics 
3.1 Calculating Service Trust Metric 
Notation 
Pi 








This section describes the calculation of service trust metric. Using service interactions in histories, 
a peer first calculates competence and integrity belief values about an acquaintance. Belief in an 
acquaintance's ability to successfully satisfy needs of interactions on a particular task is called coin- 
yetence belief [12, 13? 34, 3.51. The competence belief of pi about pi in service context is denoted by 
Description 
a peer with identifier i 
evaluation result of kt" interaction of p, with pj 
weight of kt" interaction of pi w i t h p j  
fading effect of kt" interaction of pi with p j  
service history size between pi and p, 
competence belief of pi about pj 
integrity belief of p i  about p, 
service trust value of p i  about p j  
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cbij. Obtaining an average value regarding all parameters available about service interactions can be a 
way of measuring competence belief. Thus, an interaction's evaluation result, weight and fading effect 
values are considered in the calculation of competence belief. pi calculates cbii as follows: 
3 = . ( f & )  is the normalization coefficient. If pj has completed all service interactions 
perfectly (ef'j = 1 for all I ; ) ,  the coefficient OCb ensures that cbij = 1. Additionally, cbij always takes a 
value between 0 and I since 0 5 e:. u!:: f$. 5 1. 
The level of confidence in the predictability of future interactions is called integrity belief [ I  2, 
13, 34, 35, 361. ib i j  denotes the integrity belief of pi about pj in service context. Competence of an 
acquaintance does not measure its consistency in terms of the interaction quality. A high competence 
belief value does not reveal an erratic behavior in interactions. Deviation from the average behavior 
can be a measure of integrity belief. Therefore, pi calculates ibij as an approximation to the standard 
deviation of interaction parameters: 
A smaller value of ibij ~neans more predictable behavior of p j  in future service interactions. wi> and 
f" are the mean of u;$ and /$ values in S H i j  respectively. We can approximate f$ as follows: 
' 3  
pi expects that future interactions with pj are at least as good as the average of past interactions. 
p ,  needs to determine a confidence interval for the future interactions based on cbij and ibij  values. 
Assuming the evaluation results of interactions follow a normal distribution, cbij and ibij  can be con- 
sidered as approximations for mean (p)  and standard deviation ( a )  of evaluation results of interactions 
respectively. According to the cumulative distribution function of normal distribution, an interaction 
has an evaluation result less than cb,j with a @ ( O )  = 0.5 probability. If pi sets s t i j  = chij, this is 
an over-estimation with 0.5 probability for future interactions of p,i (assuming future interactions will 
follow the normal distribution). Selecting a lower s t i j  value is a safer choice forpi. Thus, pj calculates 
s t i j  as follows: 
s t - .  = cb- . - i b .  . / 2  
' 3  ' 3  ' 3  (5) 
In this case, a future interaction's evaluation result will be less than with @(-0.5) = 0.3185 
probability. Therefore, adding integrity belief value into the calculation of service trust value forces pj 
to behave more consistently. 
Equation 5 is not complete since reputation ofpj  has not been considered. Reputation is especially 
important in the early phases of a trust relation. When there is no (or few) interactions with an acquain- 
tance, a peer relies on reputation of the acquaintance to decide about service provider selection. After 
more interactions happens with an acquaintance, Jirst-lzaizd experieizce derived through interactions 
becomes more important than reputation. Thus, s h i j  is a measure of pi's first-hand experience with pj .  
The confidence in cbij and ibij values are proportional to s h i j .  Therefore, s t i j  can be reformulated as 
follows: 
s h  s h I n a . ~  - s1zi.j s t . .  = ?' 
23 (chij  - i b z j / 2 )  + T i j  
~ h i n a r  shmax (6) 
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Table 2: Notations related with re~utation and recommendation trust metrics 
Equation 6 balances the effects of interactions and reputation on s t i j  value. When pj is a stranger to 
pi, s h i j  = 0 and sti,j = r i j .  As more interactions happens with pj (shi,j increases), rij  value loses its 
effect on sti j  value. When sh i j  = shm,ar, rij value has no effect on s t i j  value. This is the ultimate 
level of first-hand experience between two peers. 
3.2 Calculating Reputation Metric 
This section describes the calculation of the reputation metric. In the following two sections, we 
assume that pj is a stranger to pi and pk is an acquaintance of pi. To calculate r i j ,  pi starts a rep- 
utation query about pj .  Before sending the query, pi selects trustworthy acquaintances based on the 
recommendation trust values. Thus, pi may filter out some of misleading recommendations from less 
trustworthy peers. Algorithm 1 shows how pi selects trustworthy acquaintances and requests their rec- 
ommendations. qlnaX denotes the maximum number of recommendations that can be collected during 
a reputation query. 1 1  represents the size of a set. To prevent excessive network traffic, the query stops 
when qmar recommendations are collected or the required trust level drops under pTt - art. 
Let Ti = { p l : p a : .  . . p t i )  be the set of selected trustworthy acquaintances where t i  is the number 
of peers in this set. pi sends a reputation query about pj to each trustworthy peer. If pk E Ti had at 
least one service interaction with p,j, it replies a recommendation. The recommendation contains the 
following information: 
cbkj: ibk j  : These values are a measure of pk7s  first-hand experience with pj 
s h k j  : The history size is a measure of pk's confidence in cbkj and ibkj  values. If s h k j  value is 
large, pk had many service interactions with pj .  Thus, cbkj and ibk j  values are more credible for 
Pi. 
rkj : If pk had some service interactions with pj ,  it should have already calculated a reputation 
value about pj .  rkj value is a summary of recommendations of pk7s  acquaintances. pk's set of 
putation
Notation Description
er,) p;'s estimation for the reputation
of Pj derived from recommendations
ecb;j p;'s estimation for the competence beliefs
of Pj derived from recommendations
eibij Pi'S estimation for the integrity beliefs
of Pj derived from recommendations
refk evaluation of zth recommendation interaction
of Pi with Pk
T"U·'tk weight of zU' recommendation interaction
of Pi with Pk
riA fading effect of zth recommendation interaction
of Pi with Pk
rhik recommendation history size between Pi and Pk
rebik competence belief of Pi about Pk
in the recommendation context
rib;k integrity belief of Pi about Pk
in the recommendation context
rtik recommendation trust of Pi about Pk
j Pj
Pi ij ti Ti . Pj ij Ti
ti ij ax , Ti
i
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Algorithm 1 GETRECOMMENDATIONS(P~) 
1 
1 :  Prt + Cplia, rtik 
1 2: art + - J E ~ ~ ~ A ,  (rt i i  - PTL)  2 
3: thhigh + 1 
4: th~ovr + Prt + art 
5: rset + 0 
6:  while prt - crt < th,lo,,. and Irsetl < q,., do 
7 :  for all pk E Ai do 
8 : if thlo,, < rtik < thhigh then 
9: rec -e RequestRecommendation(pk,pj) 
10: rset + rset U {rec) 
11: end if 
12: endfor 
13: thhigh + thlozc 
14: thlou: + thlolc - art/:! 
15: end while 
16: return rset 
acquaintances is probably different than that of other peers. Thus, pi can make a better approxi- 
mation to global reputation of pj by aggregating reputation values from its acquaintances. 
qkj : qkj represents the number of pk7s acquaintances which provided a recommendation during 
the calculation of rkj value. This value is a measure of pk's confidence in rkj value. If 11kj value 
is close to q,,,, rkj value is more credible. 
Including shkj  and qij  values in the recommendation will protect the credibility of pk in pi's view. 
pk's knowledge about pj is insufficient, pi will figure this out with small sh,kj and qkj values. Thus, 
will not judge pk harshly if cbkj; ibkj: rkj values are inaccurate as compared to recommendations of 
other acquaintances. 
pi evaluates all the information according to the recommendation trust value of pk which is rt ik.  
The calculation of recommendation trust value is explained later in Section 3.3. If pk never had a 
recommendation interaction with pi, we set rtik = rik (Since pk is an acquaintance of pi, rik shoiild 
already be computed.). Later: pi updates rtik value for each recommendation of pk. 
pi first calculates erij, an estimation of reputation of pj, by aggregating reputation values in the 
recommendations. A reputation value collected from a large set of peers is more credible since more 
peers agree on it. Therefore, rkj value should be considered with respect to qkj value. With this 
observation, erij can be calculated as in Equation 7. Per = CpkET? (rtik . 1 1 ~ )  is the normalization 
coefficient for erij . 
1 
e r . .  23 = - 
Per C (rt i t  ~ 1 3  . r Y )  
P l i E T i  
Then, pi calculates estimations of competence and integrity beliefs about pj which are denoted by 
ecbij and eibij respectively. When calculating these values, an acquaintance's first-hand experience 
with pj should be considered since each acquaintance has a different level of experience. shkj  value 
is a measure of pb7s level of first-hand experience with &. Thus, cbkj and ibkj values should be 
evaluated in proportion to slzkj value. Equation 8 and 9 show the calculation of ecbij and eibij values. 
l i TRECOM ENDATlONS(Pj)
I: J-lr ¢::: 1);1 LpkEA;
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: l Pk
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• 'rJ : 'rJ P 's i
P 's f 77
'rJmax,
S j 'rJk P P S
If P 'S P i i t, Pi Sh 'rJkj
Pi Pk ebkj , kj , f
.
Pi t l P ik'
Pk
Pi i. Pk Pi u
, Pi P
P t j, Pj
t. 'rJkj
ti , ij . (J r LpkET; tik . 77kj)
i i t ij.
(7)
, Pi Pj
e ij i ij ti l . l l ti t l , i t ' i t i
Pj kj
i Pk'S l l i t i it Pj. , e kj i kj l l
hkj . e ij i ij
9
Pecb = xpkETi (r t ik  . s h k j )  is the normalization coefficient. 
Now, pi has two types of information to calculate r , ?  value. While e ~ b ? , ~  and eibij represent pi's 
acquaintances own experiences about pj ,  erij represents their uncertain information. pi calculates 
psh = z p k E T i ( s h k j ) / t i  which is the average level of first-hand experience of pi's acquaintances. If 
~ i , h  is close to shIna ,  value, pi's acquaintances had many service interactions with pj and their first- 
hand experience about pj is very good. In this case, ecbij and eib,;j values should be given more 
importance than erij value. Otherwise, erij value should be more important. With these observations, 
rij  is calculated in a similar way as s t i j :  
3.3 Calculating Recommendation Trust Metric 
After calculating rij  value, pi should update recommendation trust values of acquaintances according 
to the accuracy of recommendations. This section explains how pi evaluates pk's recommendation and 
update rtik value. 
The information about recommendation interactions are stored in reconzi~~e~zdntior? histories. The 
evaluation result of zth recommendation interaction of pi with pk is denoted by 0 5 re:k < 1. Similar 
to service interactions, rsu,zk, r,f$ and r ts tk  denotes the weight, fading effect, and timestamp of zth 
recommendation interaction of pi with pk. Let y f j  = (re:k: ru:,j;. 7. f$ . :  r t s t k )  be a tuple representing 
the information about zt" recommendation interaction of pi with pk. Recommendation history of pi 
with pk is denoted by R H i p  = {y:k; . . .?;;hi*). rh i r  is the size of R H i r  and rh,,,, denotes the 
upper bound of recommendation history size known by all peers. 
To calculate re& value, r k J :  cbkj and ibkj  values should be compared with eri j ,  ecbij and eibi,,? 
values. Therefore, pi calculates rerk as follows: 
pk should be accountable according to the importance of its recommendation which we represent 
with r w $  value. From Equation 7, 8 and 9, pk's recommendation affects rij value in proportion to 
s h k j  and 7k.j values. Additionally, the effect of s h k j  and v k j  values on rij value is proportional to L L , ~  
due to Equation 10. Thus, pi calculates the importance of pk's recommendation as follows: 
If s h k j  and v k j  values are small, rwtk  value will be small. L j i s l , ]  value balances the effects of shkJ 
and v k j  values on rwfk  value. If Lp,,,] is large, s h k j  value is given more importance. Otherwise, qkj 
is more important. 
(3 b LpkETi tik kj ) nn
(8)
(9)
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Figure I : Operations during recommendation and service interactions 
i t i k  is calculated in the same way as s t ik  The competence and integrity beliefs of pi about pk in 
the recommendation context are denoted by rcb,k and ribtk respectively. With these parameters, p, 
calculates rt,k as follows: 
rui:; and r f' are the mean of rw: and i f &  values in RHij respectively. = ( r w 5  . T- f$) ?? is the normal~zation coefficient for rcbik. If pi had no recommendation interaction with pk, rtik = r i k  
according to Equation 15. 
Fig. I depicts the whole scenario briefly. p j  is a probable service provider for pi's request. As- 
suming pJ is a stranger to pi, pi needs to start a reputation query to learn about pj's reputation. pi 
sends a reputation query to all trustworthy acquaintances. Assume that p k  is an acquaintance of pi 
and had some interactions with pj.  Next, pk  sends back a recon~mendation to pi. After collecting all 
recommendations, pi calculates rij value. Then, pi evaluates pk's recon~mendation, stores the results 
in RHik, and updates rtik, value. Assuming p,j is trustworthy enough, pi requests a service from pj .  
After having the service, pi evaluates the service interaction, stores the results in SHij, and updates 
stij value. 
3.4 Selecting Service Providers 
When pi queries the network for a particular service, it gets a list of service providers. pi selects 
one or several service providers according to their trustworthiness. Service trust metric is the primary 
criterion for this selection process. For the rest of this section, considering a file sharing application, 
pi is assumed to download a file from an uploader. 
Selecting best service provider. pi usually can not check the authenticity of a file until its down- 
load finishes. If pi prefers to download from several uploaders, pi can not blame an uploader due to an 
inauthentic file. Because, pi can not determine if the whole file or some parts downloaded from a ma- 
licious uploader is inauthentic. To prevent such situations, pi may prefer to select one service provider. 
1.recommendation
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pi sorts service trust values of uploaders by using the comparison function given in Algorithm 2 and 
selects the uploader with highest trust value. Sometimes, a stranger to pi might be selected due to its 
good reputation. Suppose p,,, is a such stranger. pi sets st,, = ri,,, due to Equation 6. Thus, p,, can 
be compared with other peers by using Algorithm 2. 
Algorithm 2 C O M P A R E - S T ( ~ , ~ , , ~ , )  
I :  if sti,, > st,, then 
2: return GREATER 
3: else if stiln < stin then 
4: return LESS 
5: else if stim = then 
6: if shim > shin then 
7 : return GREATER 
8: else if shin, < shin then 
9: return LESS 
10:  else if .5hiIn = ~ h , ~ ,  then 
I I :  if chi, - ibi1,/2 > cb,.,, - ib in /2  then 
12: return GREATER 
13: else if cbi, - ib im/2  < cbin - ibi, / 2  then 
14: return LESS 
IS :  else if cbiln - ib,,,/2 = cbin - ib in /2  then 
16: if cbi, > chi,, then 
17: return GREATER 
18: else if cbiln < cb,, then 
19: return LESS 
20: end if 
2 I : end if 
22: end if 
23: if pln .uploadspeed > = p,, .uploadspeed then 
24: return GREATER 
25: else if p, .uploadspeed < p, .uploadspeed then 
26: return LESS 
27: end if 
28: end if 
29: return EQUAL 
Selecting several service provider. One uploader may cause slow downloads and high loads on 
reputable peers. For a faster download, pi may prefer to select multiple uploaders '. In this case, pi 
selects all uploaders whose service trust value is larger than a threshold value. With a high threshold, pi 
may never select an uploader and can not start a download. Thus, pi's can not build a trust relationships 
with others. On the other hand, a low threshold value may lead to selection of possible malicious peers. 
pi needs to adjust threshold values according to its set of acquaintances. If pi has a low trust in its 
acquaintances, it sets a low threshold value. This helps pi to start interactions with strangers so its set 
of acquaintances can grow. When pi has a high trust in its acquaintances, it sets higher threshold values 
'TO check integrity of downloaded files: some complex methods that use Merkel Hashes [37] or secure hashes and 
cryptograpy[38] may be applied. Othe~wisc. a naive method may be as follows. I f  pi downloads an inauthentic file, it may 
request hashes of the file segments from all or several trustworthy uploaders. According to their responses. pi may identify 
the malicious uploader. In this paper. we do not study integrity checking in detail since it is beyond the scope of this 1.esearcl1. 
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so the probability of selecting malicious uploaders drops. Algorithm 3 shows an adaptive selection 
method. 
Algorithm 3 SELECTMULTIPLEUPLOADERS(U) 
4: t h  + pst + ost 
5 :  while IS/ < m,ax,,p~,,der and tlz > 0 do 
6: S + S U {p,, E U : st,,, 2 th )  
7: th  + t h  - 4 2  
8: end while 
9: if S = 8 then 
10: S + S U { p n , ~ U : s h l l n = O )  
I I .  end if 
12. return S 
U is the set of uploaders that provide the service requested by p, .  S is the set of selected uploaders. 
If none of the trustwortl~y uploaders is selected (S = 8): strangers in U are selected. In this way, new 
peers can join the network and build trust relations. Such critical trust decisions may require human 
intervention. Thus, the user interface of P2P application should be able to provide input for critical 
operations. 
3.5 Further Issues 
Storage space for histories. Storing histories do not have excessive storage cost. Assume that 
sh,,,, = rh,,,, = 20 and size of a history entry is 40 bytes. If a peer has 2000 acquaintances, 
2.20.2000.40 = 3 2 0 0 K B i s  needed for both service and recommendation histories. Having 2000 
acquaintances is a rare case [17, 181 and history size with each acquaintance will be less than slz,,,, 
generally. Therefore, storage requirements are negligible compared to the benefits of the trust model. 
Repeating reputation query. A peer updates reputation values of its acquaintances by repeating 
reputation queries periodically. Updated reputation values may help to increase confidence on good 
peers and identify malicious peers before being attacked. If an acquaintance always stays honest, its 
reputation increases with time or stays at a high level. Reputation of malicious peers decreases as 
long as they continue to attack. Knowing how an acquaintance behaves with others may help a peer 
to understand possible threats about the acquaintance. For example, assume that pi is a very reputable 
peer and pj is one of its acquaintances. pj attacks all peers but pi. Thus, pi knows pj as a good 
peer and gives good recommendations about p , ~ .  By taking advantage of pi's reputation and good 
recommendations, p j  can attract new victims. This also decreases other peers' recommendation trust 
in pi since its recommendations are misleading. If pi periodically repeats reputation queries, pi can 
learn about pj's bad reputation. Thus, pi's recommendations can at least inform others about pj's bad 
reputation. 
Pseudonyms. A peer selects an arbitrary pseudonyln which is the identity of the peer known by 
others. Peers have a level of privacy through selection of their own pseudonyms. However, a malicious 
peer may try to use a reputable peer's pseudonym so i t  can use reputation to attract more victims. This 
can be prevented by associating a pseudonym with a publiclprivate key pair so a {yse~ldol7?an, public 
key)  pair becomes the identity of a peer. Peers exchange {pseudonym, public key) pairs before an 
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interaction and run a challenge-response protocol to make sure if the other peer has the corresponding 
private key. Thus, no peer can use the pseudonym of another peer. Two peers may select the same 
pseudonym as long as their publiclprivate key pairs are different. Selection of the same publiclprivate 
key pair has a low probability considering the size of key space. To guarantee uniqueness, pseudonyms 
might be registered in a central peer. 
Reacting to attacks. Assume that pi is a good peer and p j  is malicious. When pi receives pj's 
recommendation which deviates a lot from other recommendations, it can not determine if pj  is telling 
the truth or trying to mislead. Thus, pi does the normal trust calculation. As fi continue to give 
misleading recommendations, pi slowly loses its trust in pj.  If p j  uploads a virus-infected file, pi can 
detect this right after the download completes. There are several methods to counter this situation: 
p, can create apenizn~zenr il~temction which has an infinite life period, and is never deleted from 
the history If pi continue to upload virus-infected files, pi will add more permanent interactions 
in pj's history and lose its trust in pi slowly. However, p j  may perform more attacks until pi 
looses i t  trust completely. 
After adding a permanent interaction. pi may delete pj's past interactions so its trust in p j  drops 
quickly. However, when p, gives a recommendation about p j  to another peer, the recommenda- 
tion will be considered weak since p; does not have many interactions with pj.  
pi adds a permanent interaction and sets evaluation results of pj's interactions to zero. In this 
case, pi's recommendations about pi reflects its past experience with p j  and will be considered 
stronger than previous case. 
The experiments in Section 4 uses the last method to counter inauthenticlinfected file uploads. 
Sending complaints to acquaintances. As a method of warning other peers, a peer may send com- 
plaints about a malicious peer to its acquaintances [4]. However, this can be a type of attack. Because, 
a malicious peer may start to blackmail others after gaining a good reputation. Reputation queries 
are more safer than complaints in order to learn about trustworthiness of other peers. A query may 
result iRa misleading reputation value i f  the majority of recommenders maliciously collaborate to give 
deceptive information about the queried peer. Probability of such a collaboration is smaller than the 
probability of that a peer individiially sends a malicious complaint. Thus, querying all acquaintances 
is more resilient to attacks. 
4 Experiments and Analysis 
Objectives of Experiments. Experiments will be performed to understand how SORT is siiccessful 
in mitigating attacks on a file sharing application. Distribution of trust metrics will be examined to 
understand if malicious peers are isolated from other peers. If a malicious peer is successful in a 
scenario, the reasons will be investigated. How recommendations are (or not) helpful in correctly 
identifying malicious peers is a question to be studied. 
Method. The simulation program is implemented in Java programming language. Simulation 
parameters are generated according to the findings of several empirical studies [17, 18, 191. This 
enables us to make more realistic observations on evolution of trust relationships and understand the 
effects of network specific parameters on the proposed methods. 
Since a file sharing application is simulated, uploading a file is a service interaction. A peer shar- 
ing files for others is called an zrl~loadel-. A peer downloading a file from an uploader is called a 
do~iriloa~ler. The set of peers which a peer is an acquaintance with is called do~~~z1oader.s of the peer. 
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In simulation: a file search request returns all online uploaders in the network. As discussed in 
Section 3.4, downloading a file from multiple uploaders requires a complex integrity checlung method 
[37, 381. A peer is assumed to download a file from one uploader. If a simulation experiment does not 
use SORT, a downloader selects an uploader with the highest bandwidth. If SORT is used, selection 
is based on trustwo~thiness of uploaders. An uploader might reject an incoming upload request if it 
has reached its maximum number of upload sessions. In this case, other uploaders are checked until a 
suitable one is found. A peer can check the integrity of a file only after finishing its download. A peer 
is assumed to have antivirus software so it can detect if a file is infected. At the start of each cycle, the 
simulator does the following: 
The ongoing download sessions are checked. For each session, file segments downloaded in the 
previous cycle is calculated and added to previously completed file segments. 
Each finished download session is recorded as an interaction. The downloader may decide to 
share the file. If the file is not shared, it is recorded as a past download This prevents from 
downloading the same file again. 
For each peer. onlineloffline status is determined for the cunent cycle. According to new status 
of peers, ongoing sessions might be paused or a paused session might be resumed. 
Online peers may create new download sessions. When creating a download session, a random 
file is selected. The network is searched for an online uploader of the selected file. 
A completed download session is evaluated based on the following parameters: 
Agreed Bandwidth. Before starting a session, the downloader and uploader makes a bandwidth 
agrement. The average bandwidth during the whole session is compared with the agreed band- 
width to evaluate the reliability of the uploader in terms of bandwidth provided. 
O~zline/Ofline rrrtio. If an uploader goes offline frequently, the download will take more time. 
The ratio of online and offline periods is a parameter for the availability of the uploader. 
According to these parameters, pi can evaluate its k th  interaction with pJ as follows: 
,?. = ( Onl ine  AverngeBwidtk 
Online + 0 f f l ine + AgreedBwidth 112 (1 6) 
Each download has a different weight (importance) according to following parameters: 
File Size. Downloading a movie file generally consumes more bandwidth and time than a text 
file. Thus, a large sized file is more important than a small one. However, files over a certain 
size should be considered same. A 100 Mb file size is set as the threshold. Files larger than 100 
Mb is considered same. 
Populari@ Some files might be popular and peers are more willing to download them. We 
assumed that number of uploaders is an indication of the popularity of a file. To understand how 
popular a file is, number of uploaders of a file is compared with the file shared by largest number 
of uploaders. 
Let Uploader,,,, be largest number of uploaders for the most popular file and f size is the size of a 
downloaded file. pi can calculate the weight of its kth interaction with pj as follows: 
f s z ze  2 ioonrs (1 + &r;ea::;: 
w: = 
> 12 
# Cploaders f < ' O o n l B  (- f ~p/oadei,,,, )I2 
(16)
(17)
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Table 3: Some parameters used in simulation setup 
1 Number of Peers I 1000 i 
I Number of Resources I 10000 1 
Number of Cycles 1 50000 
Minutes in a cvcle 1 10 
Number of Runs 
Reputation Query Cache Expire(cyc1es) 2000 
Reputation Update Period(cyc1es) 
Input Parameters. Table 3 shows some important input parameters of the simulation experiments. 
Each experiment is run for five times and results of these runs are averaged and stored as final values. 
An experiment contains 1000 peers and 10000 unique files which are identified by ID numbers. At 
the start of an experiment, no peer has any acquaintances. The time is simulated as cycles where each 
cycle represents a 10 minutes period of time. An experiment runs for 50000 cycles. Peers cache results 
of reputation queries for 2000 cycles to reduce network traffic. The caching strategy is explained in 
Section 4.1. Peers repeat reputation queries in every 5000 cycles to update reputation values of their 
acquaintances. Some statistics about peer interactions are reported in every I000 cycles. For each peer, 
number of simultaneous upload (or download) sessions is limited to a maximum number between 0 
and 5. Additionally, a peer can start at most two downloads in a day period. 
Table 4 shows the distribution of some parameters used to model peer and resource characteristics. 
Since the experiments do not simulate as many peers and resources as in a real life scenario, these 
distributions are approximations to empirical results. File sizes are assigned according to Table 4(a). 
For example, 75% of all files have a size between 1000 and 10000 kilobytes. A file is shared by 
multiple peers. While popular files are shared by many peers, others will be shared by a few peers. 
Table 4(b) shows the popularity distribution of files. 5% of all files are most popular and are shared by 
51 -100 source peers. Table 4(c) shows the distribution of download and upload bandwidths of peers. 
Each peer may stay online for a different period of time as shown in Table 4(d). A peer becomes online 
once in a day. After going offline, a peer becomes online in the next day. 50% of all peers stay online 
only 60 minutes in a day. At the start of a simulation, peers are assigned to a number of shared files 
according to the distribution given in Table 4(e). Since a peer downloads and shares files from others, 
its number of shared files changes continuously. 25% of all peers never share a file but they download 
files. A download session is suspended if the uploader goes offline. The downloader may catch the 
uploader online later and complete the session. This prevents unnecessary session cancellations. If 
an uploader does not become online in a period of time, the suspended session is deleted. Table 4(f) 
shows the maximum waiting periods for suspended sessions. For example, waiting period for a file 
size between 100 and 1000 kb is 5 cycles. After 5 cycles, the downloader restarts the session with 
another uploader and records the terminated session as a failed interaction. A peer tends to wait more 
for a large file [I 71. 
Different types of malicious peers will be simulated in the experiments. Behavior of a malicious 
peer is an input to the experiments. 
Attacker Model. Two types of attacks are defined: Service-based and Recommendatio17-based. 
Uploading a virus infected or inauthentic file is called a service-based attack. Giving misleading 
Maximum Simultaneous Downloads 
Maximum Simultaneous Uploads 
Maximum Interaction Historv 
1 Maximum Recommendation History 
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Table 4: Simulation parameters to represent peer and resource characteristics 
(a) File Size Distribution (b) Initial Uploader Distribution (c) Bandwidth Distribution of Peers 
(d) Uptime Distribution of 
Peers 
recommendations is called a recol1zl1zelzdatiol1-based attack. There are two types of misleading rec- 
ommendations [I]:  (i) Ulzfairly high I-ecoml~ze~zdation: Giving a positively-biased trust value about 
the recommended peer where r ,  cb, ib values are set to I. (ii) Unfairly low recommendatiolz: Giving 
a negatively-biased trust value about the recommended peer where r ,  cb, ib values are set to 0. A fair 
reco17~1~le1zdarion s the recommender's unbiased trust information about a peer. 
A llzalicio~~s peer may upload infectedlinauthentic files to others and give misleading recommen- 
dations. A goodpeer always uploads authentic files and gives fair recommendations. A non-17zalicious 
17etwork consists of only good peers. A n7alicio~ls network contains both good and malicious peers. In 
our experiments, a malicious network is assumed to have 10% malicious and 90% good peers. Ma- 
licious peers are assumed to be more powerful. They are assigned longer online periods than good 
peers. Therefore, the actual ratio of online malicious peers to online good peers is nearly 20% during 
the experiments. 
Malicious peers are classified according to the capability of their collaboration. If malicious peers 
do not know about each other and perform attacks independently, they are called i17dividual attackers. 
An individual attacker may attack other malicious peers since it can not identify them. If malicious 
peers know about each other and coordinate in launching attacks, they are called collaborators. Based 
on the classification of attack behavior, there are three types of individual attackers: 
(e) Shared File Distribution (f) Maximum Waiting Times During a 
of Peers Download Session 
1 .  Naive. An attacker always uploads infectedlinauthentic files and gives unfairly low recommen- 
dations to others [I].  
File Size (kb) 
100 - 1000 
1000 - 10000 
10000 - 100000 
100000 - 1 000000 
2. Discriminatory. An attacker selects a group of victims and always uploads infectedlinauthentic 
files to them [ I ,  101. It uploads authentic files to all other peers. Additionally, it gives unfairly 







3. Hypocritical. An attacker generally uploads authentic files and gives fair recommendations. 
With x% probability, i t  behaves maliciously by uploading infectedliauthentic files and giving 
unfairly low recommendations [ 5 ,  101. 
)
File Size (kb) Ratio
100 - 1000 0.10
,
1001 - 10000 0.75
10001 - 100000 0.10
10000 I - 1000000 0.05
Initial Uploaders Ratio
1 - 10 0.60
11 - 30 0.20
31 - 50 0.15
51 - 100 0.05
Download-Upload
Bandwidth (kbps) Ratio
128 - 64 0.10
512 - 128 0.10
1024 - 256 0.40
3036 - 768 0.20
10240 - 5120 0.15
102400 - 10240 0.05
Uptime (min) Ratio
1 - 60 0.50
61 - 120 0.20
121 - 180 0.10
181 - 240 0.05
241 - 360 0.05
361 - 600 0.05




1 - 10 0.20
11 - 100 0.30
101 - 300 0.10
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Collaborators always upload authentic files to each other. When a collaborator requests a recom- 
mendation from another collaborator, it always receives a fair recommendation. Collaborators always 
give ilnfairly high recommendations about each other when requested by a good peer. Thus, they try 
to convince the good peer to download files from any one of the them. All collaborators behave same 
in the situations described above. Three types of collaborators are defined according to their attack 
behavior: 
I. Naive collaborator. A collaborator always uploads infectedlinauthentic files to good peers and 
gives unfairly low recommendations about them. 
2. Discriminato?y collnborator. A collaborator always uploads infectedinauthentic files to a group 
of selected victims and gives unfairly low recommendations about them. It behaves with peers 
other than a collaborator or a victim in a fair manner, i.e., with authentic files and fair recom- 
mendations. 
3. Hypocritical collaborntor. A collaborator uploads infectedlinauthentic files to good peers or 
gives unfairly low recommendations about them with x% probability. In the other times, it 
behaves with them fairly. 
A trust model should be resistant to Sybil attacks [9] since changing pseudonym is easy in a P2P 
system. A malicious peer which changes its pseudonym periodically to escape from being identified 
is called a pseudospoofer. We assume it is hard to achieve collaboration among pseudospoofers since 
a tight synchronization and coordination is needed. Thus, a pseudospoofer is assumed to behave in 
one of the individual attacker behaviors, e.g., naive, hypocritical and discriminatory, even though i t  
changes its pseudonym periodically. 
Output Parameters. The number of service-based attacks with respect to time is the most impor- 
tant output parameter. This value gives a measure for how SORT is successful in mitigating service- 
based attacks. Additionally, the rate of successful downloads will be observed to understand how much 
mitigating attacks had a positive impact on download operations. 
The number of recommendation-based attacks with respect to time is a measure of SORT'S success - 
in mitigating recommendation-based attacks. If many recommendation-based attacks are happening, 
malicious peers are able to give misleading recommendations and able to affect decisions of other 
peers. 
The distribution of values of reputation, service trust and recommendation trust will be observed. 
This helps to understand if good peers assign fair trust values to each other and malicious peers are 
isolated from them. These distributions also give insights about the evolution of trust relationships. 
These insights are very helpful in explaining the effects of malicious behavior on the success of attacks. 
Message communication during reputation queries is a measure of overhead of SORT. Number of 
recommendation requests and number of answers to them are some parameters to observed. 
4.1 Experiment 1: Understanding the parameters effective on trust 
In this section, several parameters affecting the evolution of trust relationships are to be analyzed. To 
isolate the effects of service and recommendation-based attacks, experiments are performed on a non- 
malicious network topology with and without using SORT. Analysis from these experiments will help 
us to understand the evolution of trust relationships under attack scenarios. 
Download Rate. Fig. 2 shows the number of si~ccessful downloads in every 1000 cycles with 
respect to time. Interestingly, there is a small decrease in the number of downloads with SORT. This is 
due to the uploader selection method. Without using SORT? uploaders are selected based on their net- 
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Figure 2: Successful downloads with respect 
to time in a non-malicious network 
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Figure 3: Reputation values in a non- 
malicious network with respect to bandwidth 
and online time 
0 200 400 600 SO0 1000 1200 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 SO0 900 
Number of Shared Files Number of Doa.nloaderr 
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Figure 4: Distributionof reputation values in a non-malicious network 
based on trustworthiness of uploaders. An acquaintance is always preferred over a stranger. Download 
rate decreases due to this selection since an acquaintance with low bandwidth might be selected even 
though there is a stranger with high bandwidth. 
Reputation vs. Bandwidth and Online Period. SORT'S design minimizes the disadvantage in 
the download rate. A peer is more capable of completing file upload requests if it has a high bandwidth 
and stays online longer. This peer is more likely to get high evaluation results from its downloaders 
based on Equation 16. Additionally, such a peer can complete more large file upload requests than a 
peer with low bandwidth and short online periods ? According to Equation 17, uploading a large file 
has more positive effect on reputation than uploading a small file. Fig. 3 justifies that a peer with high 
bandwidth and long online period tends to have a higher reputation value among its downloaders . The 
abnormal values in Fig. 3 are due to the other parameters such as the number of shared files. 
Reputation vs. Shared Files. A peer's reputation also depends on its number of shared files. Fig. 
4(a) shows average reputations of peers among their downloaders. A peer sharing large number of files 
(file-rich peer) gets more download requests and has more downloaders. Reputation queries about a 
file-rich peer generally return many recommendations due to its large set of downloaders. According 
'~imit ing the number of si~nultaneous uploads helps 10 maintain this behavior. Because, a peer does not ovel-load itself 
by accepting more download requests than i t  can handle. 
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(a) Service T n ~ s t  vs. Reputation (b) Recommendation T ~ u s t  vs. Reputation 
Figure 5: Service and recommendation trust values with respect to reputation values in a non-malicious 
network 
Averape Ser\.ice Hi.s~or). Size AYerape History Size 
(a) Service Trust vs. Average Service History Size (b) Reco~nmendation Trust vs. Average Recornmenda- 
tion History Size 
Figure 6: Service and recommendation trust values with respect to history sizes in a non-malicious 
network 
to Equation 7, number of recommenders is a parameter in reputation calculation. Thus, a file-rich peer 
generally have a good reputation. Fig. 4(b) shows how the size of set of downloaders affect reputation. 
A peer with large set of downloaders tends to have a good reputation. Being known by 10% of all peers 
is enough to build a good reputation for most peers. 
Reputation vs. Service and Recommendation Trust Values. Service trust values have a high 
correlation with reputation values as shown in Fig. 5(a). Due to their calculation method in Equation 
6, this correlation is expected. However, this strong correlation is not observed between recommen- 
dation trust and reputation values as shown in Fig. 5(b). The reason can be clarified from Fig. 6(a) 
and 6(b). For most cases, a peer performs only one service interaction with an acquaintance. The 
probability that a peer downloads two or more files from an acquaintance is low since the acquaintance 
may not have a requested file or might be offline at the time of download request. Very few service 
interactions do not disrupt the strong correlation between reputation and service trust values. However, 
a peer generally requests recommendations from an acquaintance before every file download. A high 
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Figure 7: Overhead of reputation queries in terms of network packets for a non-malicious network 
Overhead of SORT. Main overhead of SORT comes from the reputation queries. Before starting 
a download session, a peer queries its acquaintances about each possible uploader and gets back rec- 
ommendations. Fig. 7(a) shows average number of recommendation requests for a download session 
with respect to the time. Since a peer obtains more acquaintances with time, the average number of 
recommendation requests monotonically increases. At 50000th. cycle, a peer makes more than 400 
requests for each download session but only 20% of them get back a recommendation. 
Caching reputation queries. A caching strategy can reduce the reputation query traffic. In a 
download session, only one uploader is selected and the reputation values calculated about unselected 
uploaders are deleted. A peer may cache the reputation values about unselected uploaders. The cached 
reputation values can be used in a future download so some of the reputation queries can be prevented. 
A cache entry is deleted after 2000 cycles. Fig. 7(b) shows the effect of caching on reputation query 
traffic. Since a peer's set of acquaintances grows with time, the number of cache entries and cache hit 
ratio increase. Caching reduces the half of reputation query traffic comparing to Fig. 7(a). 
4.2 Experiment 2: Analysis about individual attackers 
This section presents experiments on individual attackers. SORT has to mitigate service and recommendation- 
based attacks in a malicious network. However, mitigating service-based attacks is more important 
since they consume more bandwidth than recommendation-based attacks. For each individual attacker 
behavior, a separate network topology is created in which 10% of all peers have been assigned to the 
same behavior. Attack probability is set to 0.3 for hypocritical attackers. Each discriminatory attacker 
selects a separate set of victims which cover 20% of all peers. 
Service-based attacks. Fig. 8(a) shows the number of service-based attacks in every I000 cycles 
for naive attackers. SORT mitigates the attacks more than 50% after 10000" cycle. After 20000th 
cycle, more than 80% of the attacks have been prevented. The attacks do not stop completely since 
all good peers do not know about all malicious peers. Due to decrease in service-based attacks, the 
average number of successful downloads increases nearly 25% as shown in Fig. 8(b). 
Fig. 9 presents the number of service-based attacks in hypocritical and discriminatory behavior. 
Good peers start to learn about attackers from the beginning of the simulation and 80% of service-based 
attacks are mitigated after 20000th cycle. The number of successful downloads increase around 4-5% 
with SORT. The increase is not substantial as in naive attacker case. The reason is that naive attackers 
try to attack every peer and the number of their attacks is much higher than in the case of hypocritical 
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Figure 8: Service-based attack and successful download statistics for naive attackers 
Figure 9: Service-based attacks with respect to time for hypocritical and discriminatory attackers 
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Figure 10: Reputation values with respect to number of downloaders for naive and hypocritical attack- 
ers. 
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in small numbers comparing to naive attackers. 
Reputation. At the end of experiment, all naive attackers have zero reputation among other peers 
as shown in Fig. 10(a). Naive attackers can not gain trust of good peers since they do not successfully 
complete a service interaction. However, some naive attackers having large number of shared files 
succeed to attack 600-700 downloaders. 
Fig. 10(b) shows the average reputation values for hypocritical attackers. Comparing to naive 
attacker, these attackers have succeeded to build up some reputation. The low number of their attacks 
affects their reputation. Their average reputation is lower than most of the good peers. 
Discriminatory attackers have slightly larger average reputation values than hypocritical ones. The 
reason is that they attack only victims, and non-victim good peers assign them good reputation values. 
Their average reputation is still lower than good peers. The victims learn about them with time, and 
eventually, their attacks can be mitigated as shown in Fig. 9. 
Recommendation Trust. Recommendation trust values are need to studied to understand if all 
recommendations are being evaluated correctly. Fig. 11 shows that discriminatory attackers have less 
recommendation trust values than good peers. The reconlmendations of good peers are more credible 
than that of discriminatory attackers. For hypocritical attackers, recommendation trust values have a 
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Figure 13: Service-based attack with respect Figure 14: Successfiil downloads with respect 
to time for hypocritical and discriminatory at- to time for hypocritical attackers 
tackers 
lower average than discriminatory attackers. Naive attackers have zero average for recommendation 
trust values since they have zero reputation. Since all attacker types have a lower recommendation trust 
values than good peers, recommendation-based attacks are mitigated as shown in Fig. 12. 
Another interesting observation from data in Fig. 11 is that having a large set of downloaders 
might have a negative effect on recommendation trust values. A peer with many downloaders will 
get more recommendation requests. A peer giving many recommendations is more prone to giving 
inaccurate information since any recommendation has some uncertainty. This might reduce a peer's 
average recommendation trust value among its downloaders. 
4.3 Experiment 3: Analysis about collaborative attackers 
In this section, the effects of collaborative attacks on trust relationships will be studied. Collaboration 
among peers makes the detection of malicious peers more-difficult. For each collaborative behavior, 
a separate malicious network topology is created. As in the case of individual attackers, hypocritical 
collaborators attack with 0.3 probability. All discriminatory collaborators agree on the same group of 
victims which contain 20% of all peers. 
Service-based attacks. In naive collaborators, more than 80% of attacks are stopped after 20000th 
cycle, and thus, successful downloads increase 25% percent. Since naive collaborators upload only 
infectedhnauthentic files, good peers quickly identify their intention and assign a zero reputation value 
to them. Since good peers do not request their recommendations, collaborators can not amplify each 
other's reputation. Thus, naive collaborators do not benefit from collaboration. 
Fig. 13 shows the successful attacks with respect to time for hypocritical and and discriminatory 
collaborators. For the first 15000 cycles, hypocritical collaborators take advantage of recommendations 
to amplify each other's reputation and attract more good peers to get services from them. After 15000th 
cycle, good peers start to identify some collaborators and the rate of attacks starts to fall down. The 
situation in hypocritical behavior is not observable in discriminatory behavior since victims start to 
figure out collaborators from the very beginning of the experiment. Thus, attack rate monotonically 
decreases in discriminatory behavior. 
The situation for hypocritical collaborators in the first 15000 cycles affects successful download 
rate as shown in Fig. 14. Before 20000th cycle, rate of the successful downloads is lower with SORT. 
Good peers continue to download from collaborators due to their fake amplified reputation in the first 
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Figure 15: Reputation values with respect to number of downloaders for hypocritical and discrimina- 
tory collaborators. 
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Figure 16: Recommendation trust values with respect to number of downloaders for hypocritical and 
discriminatory collaborators. 
Reputation. Naive collaborators always have zero reputation values due to the reasons explained 
earlier. Fig. 15(a) shows the reputation values for hypocritical collaborators at the end the experiment. 
Collaborators gain very low reputation although they disseminate amplified recommendations about 
each other. The situation at 25000th cycle is very similar to Fig. 15(a). Considering the observations 
from Fig. 13 and 14, it can be concluded that good peers identify collaborators between 15000th and 
25000~'~ cycles and reduce their reputation quickly. 
Discriminatory collaborators are successful in gaining a good reputation as shown in Fig. 15(b). 
Since they attack only victims, their reputation among non-victim good peers remain high. Further- 
more, their unfairly low recommendations decrease the reputation of victims. When these recommen- 
dations are gathered, they substantially affect the results of reputation calculation and victims can not 
gain high reputation. This situation is not observed in individual discriminatory behavior. Individual 
discriminatory attackers randomly select different sets of victims. Any good peer can be a victim for 
an attacker. Thus, unfairly low recommendations are almost evenly distributed on all good peers. 
Recommendation trust. Naive collaborators always have zero recommendation trust value due 
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Figure 17: Recommendation-based attacks with respect to time for collaborators. 
in Fig. 16(a). Interestingly, hypocritical collaborators have smaller recommendation trust values than 
individual hypocritical attackers. This might appear to be an abnormality since collaborators praise 
each other with unfairly high recommendations. However, a collaborator loses recommendation trust 
of good peers after giving unfairly high recommendations. The reason is that an unfairly high rec- 
ommendation substantially deviates from fair recommendations of good peers. Hence hypocritical 
collaborators lose recommendation trust of good peers faster than individual hypocritical attackers. 
They also pollute the pool of recommendations with unfairly high ones. Fair recommendations of 
good peers get relatively low evaluations due to these unfairly high recommendations. Eventually, 
good peers have slightly lower trust values than individual attacker scenario. 
Fig. 16(b) shows recommendation trust values of discriminatory collaborators. Since they give 
misleading recommendations collaboratively, good peers believe the trustworthiness of their recom- 
mendations. Good peers develop a high recommendation trust in collaborators. Since recommenda- 
tions of collaborators are considered to be true, good peers loose recommendation trust in each other. 
Victims give low recommendations about collaborators due to their attacks. Good peers are never 
attacked by collaborators so they think that victims are giving misleading recommendations about col- 
laborator. Thus, good peers also loose recommendation trust in victims. This abnormality does not 
cause a problem when preventing service-based attacks. Victims can identify collaborators quickly 
and protect themselves as discussed in Fig. 13. However, discriminatory collaborators can continue to 
give misleading recommendations due to their high recommendation trust value. As shown in Fig. 17, 
SORT was able to stop misleading recommendations of naive and hypocritical collaborators but not 
discriminatory ones. 
4.4 Experiment 4: Adapting Hypocritical and Discriminatory Behavior 
In this section, the attack probability in hypocritical behavior and the size of set of victims in discrimi- 
natory behavior will be changed to observe the effects of attacks on trust relationships. Individual and 
collaborative attackers are studied separately. 
Individual hypocritical attackers. Figure 18(a) shows the service-based attack rate for hypocrit- 
ical attackers when the attack probability is changed to 10% and 20%. Good peers can not identify 
malicious peers as quickly as in the case with 30% attack probability. After 20000~" cycle, attack rate 
dropped 50% and 70% for 10% and 20% attack probability, respectively. 
Recommendation-based attacks present a different distribution as shown in Figure 18(b). When 
the attack probability is 20%, rate of misleading recommendations are higher in the first 10000 cy- 
cles. Since attackers are identified faster in the case with 20% probability, the attack rate can not be 
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Figure 18: Attack statistics for individual hypocritical attackers with 10% and 20% attack probability. 
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Figure 19: Attack statistics for individual discriminatory attackers in the 100 and 400 victims cases. 
maintained and dropped. Thus, attack rate is better for 10% attack probability after 1 0 0 0 0 ~ ~  cycle. 
Individual discriminatory attackers. Figure 19(a) shows the service-based attack rate for indi- 
vidual discriminatory attackers when there are 100 and 400 victims. 80% of attacks are stopped after 
20000th cycle since victims identify attackers quickly. 
Figure 19(b) shows the situation in recommendation-based attacks. In the 400 victims case, the 
attack rate made a peak at first then dropped quickly. The reason is that misleading recommendations 
about 400 victims made a high conflict with the recommendations of good peers and victims. For the 
100 victims case, the misleading recommendations are targeted to a small group of peers and do not 
make a high conflict with other peers. Thus, misleading recommendations drops gradually in the 100 
victims case. 
Hypocritical collaborators. Changing attack probability causes interesting results for hypocritical 
collaborators. Figure 20(a) shows the service-based attack rate for hypocritical collaborators. As the 
attack probability decreases, detecting collaborators takes longer time. Collaborators take advantage 
of SORT for a longer period comparing to the 30% attack probability case shown in Figure 13. After 
30000th cycle, attack rate in the 10% probability case is higher than the 20% probability case. Because, 
collaborators are undetected for a longer time in the 10% probability case. 
This situation also affects the rate of recommendation-based attacks as shown in Fig. 20(b) . 
Before 15000~" cycle, good peers do not detect the collaborators and request more recommendations 
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Figure 20: Attack statistics for hypocritical collaborators with 10% and 20% attack probability. 
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Figure 2 1 : Attack statistics for discriminatory collaborators in the cases with 100 and 400 victims. 
from them. As more good peers start to figure out collaborators, they lose recommendation trust in the 
collaborators. Then, they request less recommendations from the collaborators. The attack rate in the 
10% probability case is higher, since the collaborators are not detected quickly. 
Discriminatory collaborators. The service-based attack rate for discriminatory collaborators is 
shown in Figure 21 (a). The attacks fall down quickly from the beginning of the experiments. In the 
100 victims case, good recommendations of non-victim good peers about collaborators motivates the 
victims to get services from collaborators. Thus, attack rate drops slower than the 400 victims case. 
The recommendation-based attacks are as shown in Figure 21 (b). Since the collaborators dominate 
100 victims, they can continue to give misleading recommendations. In 400 victims case, victims 
succeed to affect the decisions of each other and other good peers so misleading recommendations can 
be contained in a certain level. 
To understand the situation in discriminatory collaborators better, changes in the distribution of 
reputation and recommendation trust is studied. The 100 victims case presents a similar distribution 
to Figure 15(b) but victims gain a lower reputation than the 200 victims case. Figure 22(a) shows the 
distribution of reputation values in the 400 victims case. Since the victims can counter bad recommen- 
dations of collaborators, they gained as much reputation as collaborators. This has some interesting 
implications on recommendation trust value as shown in Figure 22(b). Victims gain the highest rec- 
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Figure 22: Reputation and recommendation trust values for discrin~inatory collaborators in the 400 
victims case. 
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Figure 23: Service-based attacks with respect Figure 24: Number of strangers selected with 
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of 100 collaborators can not dominate the fair recommendations of 400 victims. Thus, average trust 
values of collaborators drops and victims gain a high average trust among each other. (ii)Non-victim 
good peers give good recommendations about collaborators which conflict with the recommendations 
of victims. Thus, average trust value of non-victim good peers decreases. 
500 - 
O D E O W O C . ~ ~  
4.5 Experiment 5: Analysis about pseudospoofers 
Changing pseudonym is an easy way of clearing its bad history for a malicious peer. In this section, 
success rate of pseudospoofing attacks will be studied. The decrease in attack rate is a measure of 
resistance against Sybil attacks. In the experiments, a pseudospoofer will change its pseudonym after 
each 10000 cycles. 
Service-based attacks. Fig. 23 shows that SORT reduces service-based attack rate for naive 
pseudospoofers. After each 10000 cycles, the attack rate increases a little bit, but then it drops quickly. 
To understand how the attack rate drops, we can examine Fig. 24. This figure shows the number of 
strangers selected in each 1000 cycles. Since peers gain more acquaintances with time, they have less 
tendency to select strangers. Therefore, a pseudospoofer gets less service requests and the attack rate 
drops with time. 
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Figure 25: Service-based attacks with respect Figure 26: Recommendation-based attacks 
to time for hypocritical and discriminatory with respect to time for all pseudospoofers. 
pseudospoofers. 
The attack rate decreases with time since pseudospoofers are not selected by good peers. A slight 
increase in attack rate can still be observed after the pseudonym changes at 10000~'~ and 20000th 
cycles. 
Recommendation-based attacks. The rate of recommendation-based attacks also decreases with 
time. Since pseudospoofers are considered as strangers, they are not asked for any recommendations. 
Fig. 26 shows the decrease in misleading recommendations. 
5 Discussion on Future Work 
P2P system dynamics. Deletion of resources which lose popularity, additions of new peer/resource to 
an existing topology, multi-uploader sessions and flash crowds [39] are some of the situations that may 
affect evolution of trust relations. Studying such dynamics may help to design better trust models. 
Privacy. Reputable service providers are good victims for DOS attacks. Protecting privacy of a ser- 
vice provider is harder than protecting privacy of a service requester. Promoting reputation of a service 
provider and protecting its identity are adversarial tasks [40, 161. A peer needs privacy when giv- 
ing recommendations about malicious peers. Otherwise, it might become a target of malicious peers. 
SORT needs to be extended with a privacy scheme which protects the identity of service providers and 
recommenders. However, such a scheme needs an authentication method to prevent forgery of fake 
recommendations and the identity of peers. 
Reputation storing/collection method. Collecting reputation information from acquaintances is 
a limiting factor in the proposed trust model. Broadcasting reputation queries may cause excessive 
network traffic. DHT structures may be used to access trust information efficiently 14, 51. A trust 
holder is assigned for each peer. This approach requires that peers rely on trust holders instead of 
acquaintances. This may cause problems if trust holders behave maliciously. How a peer can develop 
trust in its trust holders is a question to be answered. Note that in SORT, a peer develops trust in 
its acquaintances through past interactions and recommendations. A compromise is needed between 
querying acquaintances and using DHT structures. 
Incentives. SORT does not force a peer to provide services such as sharing files for others. Repu- 
tation can be used as a currency when exchanging services [29,31, 321. An incentive mechanism can 
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A self-organizing trust model for P2P networks is presented in which a peer can develop trust rela- 
tions without using any priori information. Trust metrics defined on service and recommendation trust 
contexts help a peer to reason more precisely about capabilities of other peers in providing services 
and giving recommendations. In a non-malicious network, reputation of a peer is proportional to its 
capabilities such as network bandwidth, average online period on the network and number of shared 
resources. In a malicious network, service and recommendation-based attacks affect the reputation. 
Three individual attacker, three collaborator and three pseudospoofer behavior are studied in ex- 
periments. SORT reduces service-based attacks in all scenarios. For individual attackers, hypocritical 
ones take more time to identify. Identification of collaborators usually takes longer than identification 
of an individual attacker. At the start of the experiment, hypocritical collaborators succeeded to launch 
more attacks with SORT than the case when SORT is not used. The reason is that they were able take 
advantage of unfairly high recommendations in order to mislead and attract more good peers. Good 
peers eventually identify them and their attacks are mitigated. Discriminatory collaborators succeed 
in maintaining a better reputation than hypocritical ones since they do not attack 80% of the peers. 
However, their attacks are mitigated faster since victims identify them and do not download their files. 
They gain a better recommendation trust value than good peers. They also cause the victims to have a 
low recommendation trust value so they put victims into liars class. Pseudospoofers are more isolated 
from good peers after each pseudonym change. Since good peers get more acquaintances with time, 
they do not prefer to interact with strangers and leave pseudospoofers isolated. 
Defining a context of trust and its related metrics increases a peer's ability to identify and mitigate 
attacks on the context related tasks. Therefore, various contexts of trust can be defined to enhance 
security of P2P systems for specific tasks. For example, a peer might use trust metrics in order to select 
better peers while routing P2P queries, checking integrity of resources, and protecting privacy of peers. 
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